The international order is gradually shifting away from an integration-oriented approach towards major powers and towards a more uncertain multipolarity. In this environment, major powers compete within an increasingly complex geopolitical reality without a shared global architecture. This increases the importance of Middle Powers as regional “systems engineers” capable of creating stability and coordination between larger centres of power. ASEAN is a clear example of this development. The question is therefore: what limits ASEAN’s cohesion?
ASEAN is held together primarily by shared interests rather than shared values; economic development without sacrificing strategic autonomy or national sovereignty. Its cohesion therefore depends on the strength of these interests.
The member states, however, differ significantly in terms of political systems, levels of economic development, security priorities and relations with major powers. ASEAN’s greatest challenge is therefore that the interests of its members may gradually evolve in different directions. In a multipolar world, the following question becomes increasingly relevant: how far can states cooperate on growth and security without surrendering strategic autonomy? This question is equally relevant to countries in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia and the MENA region.
ASEAN’s dynamics are examined in three blog articles structured as follows:
- What holds ASEAN together?
- What Limits ASEAN's Cohesion? (this blog post)
- How far can ASEAN’s influence extend?
Three Main Forces Limit ASEAN's Internal Cohesion
Three forces in particular challenge ASEAN’s cohesion and its ability to develop as a unified actor:
- ASEAN consists of highly diverse states
- Its institutions are deliberately designed to avoid conflict rather than resolve it.
- The organisation is increasingly challenged by growing rivalry between major powers.
Each of these factors is important in its own right. Together, however, they contribute to ASEAN member states’ interests evolving in different directions, particularly as global fragmentation increases.
Internal Differences From Highly Diverse States
ASEAN member states differ substantially in both their societies and their economies.
- Political systems range from autocracies and one-party states to democracies. Consequently, ASEAN does not possess a shared political value base comparable to that of the EU. Cohesion can therefore be challenged if internal disagreements become ideological rather than practical.
- The strategic differences are equally significant. Singapore is among the world’s most globalised economies, and its success depends on global supply chains remaining open. Vietnam views China as both an economic opportunity and a security challenge. Cambodia and Laos maintain relatively close relations with China. The Philippines increasingly views China as a security threat and has strengthened its relationship with the United States in recent years. Indonesia prioritises strategic independence above all else.
- Economic differences are similarly pronounced. GDP per capita in Singapore is approximately USD 100,000, compared with roughly USD 1,500 in Myanmar. While Myanmar requires protection of domestic industries to allow them to mature and support export-led growth, Singapore benefits from deeper globalisation and freer trade.
These differences can be summarised as follows:
| Country | Political system | Economic level | Primary strategic orientation |
| Singapore | Democracy/technocraty | Very high | Globalisation |
| Vietnam | One party state | Medium | Balance between China and the West |
| Philippines | Democracy | Medium | The US |
| Indonesia | Democracy | Medium | Strategic autonomy |
| Cambodia | Authoritarian | Lower | China |
| Laos | One party state | Lower | China |
| Myanmar | Military junta | Lower | China |
| Malaysia | Democracy | Medium | Strategic autonomy |
| Thailand | Hybrid | Medium | Strategic autonomy |
| Brunei | Monarchy | High | Strategic autonomy |
| Timor-Leste | Democracy | Lower | Open |
Institutionally, ASEAN Is Designed to Avoid Conflict, Not Resolve It
ASEAN is designed to prevent conflicts from splitting the organisation rather than to adjudicate them. It is built primarily on three principles: consensus, voluntarism and non-interference.
- The consensus principle is both ASEAN’s strength and its greatest limitation. Almost all major decisions require unanimous agreement among members. This reduces the risk of internal disputes but also means that a single member state can block joint statements and initiatives. As a result, crisis management tends to be slow.
- During disputes concerning the South China Sea, member states with close relations to China have frequently blocked common ASEAN language and positions.
- The principle of voluntarism means that ASEAN cannot effectively intervene during crises. It may formulate common expectations, but it lacks the ability to enforce them.
- Following the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, ASEAN adopted a Five-Point Consensus intended to restore peace. None of its provisions, however, contained mechanisms capable of compelling Myanmar’s military junta to act. The plan was therefore largely ignored by the junta leadership, causing considerable frustration among ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
- The principle of non-interference means that national interests are almost always prioritised above regional interests in order to preserve member state sovereignty. This principle has been a major contributor to ASEAN’s success. It is also necessary because only a limited “ASEAN identity” exists among the populations of member states. By contrast, an increasing number of EU citizens identify themselves as Europeans.
The more major powers influence member states in different ways, the more ASEAN’s model comes under pressure. Conversely, cohesion tends to strengthen when external pressure is experienced relatively equally across the region.
Member States May Be Forced to Choose Between Major Powers
ASEAN functions best when all major powers are present and none demands exclusive loyalty. The organisation’s underlying logic is one of strategic balance.
Member states seek access to Chinese markets, American technology, Japanese capital, European investment and Indian growth. Their strategic flexibility is therefore increasingly challenged by US–China rivalry, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, technology and trade conflicts, as well as sanctions and emerging geopolitical blocs. As global supply chains continue to reorganise, ASEAN member states are affected in increasingly asymmetric ways. Their economic interests therefore become less aligned over time.
The stronger major-power rivalry becomes, the more difficult ASEAN’s balancing strategy becomes.
ASEAN Member States Face Different Futures
ASEAN’s greatest challenge is ultimately that member states’ interests are evolving differently.
Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia are becoming increasingly integrated into global value chains. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar remain more dependent on Chinese capital and markets. Brunei continues to be shaped by its energy-based economy, while the Philippines remains strongly oriented towards the United States from a security perspective.
Demographic trends are also diverging. Some countries face ageing populations, while others still have large cohorts entering the workforce.
Economic integration therefore does not necessarily create converging interests. On the contrary, it may increase differences between member states. ASEAN’s paradox is that successful integration can itself generate new and growing divergences among its members.
Shared Interests Are Not Necessarily Permanent
ASEAN’s cohesion is based primarily on shared interests. These interests, however, should not be assumed to be permanent.
ASEAN’s strength lies in its ability to accommodate diversity. Its members need only agree that cooperation is preferable to fragmentation.
Yet the same robustness also limits collective action. The more member states develop in different directions, the more difficult it becomes to translate shared interests into common policies.
This will be the subject of the final article in the series.