In 2026, Hungary will hold parliamentary elections. For the first time since 2010, Viktor Orbán’s grip on power is at risk, even though the country today borders on an autocratic system. The election year coincides with the 70th anniversary of Hungary’s uprising against the Soviet Union. Who will prevail this time? This second part of the trilogy examines Hungary’s Russia policy and its conflict with the EU since the financial crisis.
The Financial Crisis Paved the Way for Viktor Orbán …
The global financial crisis hit Hungary’s economy hard and opened the path for Orbán’s “Eastern Opening Policy” and his project of illiberal democracy. Relations with Russia deepened in ways that have proved problematic, eroding both democratic institutions and Hungary’s position inside the EU. Voters’ continued support has been maintained through populist fiscal policy.
... and Struck the Hungarian Economy Abruptly
When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, the German and Austrian industrial engines stopped almost overnight. Hungary’s exports and GDP fell sharply, and the country had to request a $25 billion emergency package from the IMF, the EU, and the World Bank. Confidence in the political system collapsed, and the socialist government fell after years of budget imbalances.
It was into this vacuum of identity that Viktor Orbán returned to power in 2010. His narrative was simple and aligned with Hungary’s political self-understanding: Hungary had to free itself from the West and become sovereign again. His plan was a systematic centralisation of power, cultural consolidation, electoral reform, restrictions on civil society, and control of the media. It was a slow and legally meticulous restructuring of the state, not a coup.
Politically, This Opened the Path for the Eastern Opening Policy …
Because industrial production had collapsed, Orbán in 2010 launched a strategic pivot to the East. Russia emerged as a willing investor, even though Orbán initially viewed both Russia and Putin with scepticism. Russia modernised Hungary’s ageing nuclear plants and extended state loans totalling $10 billion.
In the same period, German (and broader EU) interest in further expanding their factories in Hungary diminished. Their industries globalised instead toward China and ASEAN, capping Hungary’s industrial growth potential. Orbán’s turn toward Russia was therefore popular, even though Hungarian society has long harboured deep distrust toward Russia.
… and the Strategy of Illiberal Democracy from 2014 Onward
In 2014, Orbán openly declared that he intended to build an “illiberal democracy,” with Russia and China as models. After 2014, his strategy became explicit:
- Russia would serve as energy partner. The 2017 Paks II nuclear project with Rosatom became a symbolic anchor of Hungary’s eastern tilt, later reinforced by the 15-year Gazprom agreement in 2021.
- China would serve as investment partner. In 2015, Hungary became the first European country to sign a cooperation agreement under the Belt and Road Initiative.
- The EU would fund infrastructure and agriculture.
- Turkey and Central Asia would help balance Western pressure.
This created a foreign-policy asymmetry that the EU at first responded to cautiously, limiting itself to public criticism. But the diplomatic pressure from Brussels only strengthened Orbán’s pivot toward Russia, and, to some extent, China.
Relations with Russia Have Become Deep and Problematic …
Since 2014, Hungary has pursued a distinctly pro-Russian policy, systematically attempting to block EU sanctions against Moscow. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Hungary refused to condemn Russia. The same occurred after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, now framed domestically as a concern for inflation and for the “ordinary Hungarian.” Hungary also long blocked Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO.
The result today is a deep rift with the EU and a deep dependency on Moscow: 85% of Hungary’s natural gas and 80% of its oil now come from Russia.
… and Have Eroded Democracy and Hungary’s Standing in the EU
The Hungarian population has grown steadily more sceptical of Orbán’s strategy. To preserve power, Orbán amended the constitution 11 times between 2012 and 2022. These amendments gradually weakened press freedom, judicial independence, and civil-society institutions.
By 2021, Hungary’s constitution had been so deeply altered that the EU concluded the country no longer met fundamental rule-of-law standards. Brussels then moved to freeze up to $25 billion in annual development funds. A significant capital flight followed, as many foreign companies exited the country. Their assets were often bought up at very low prices by individuals close to Orbán.
Voter Support Has Been Maintained Through Populist Fiscal Policy
This further frustrated the voter base. To retain it, Orbán turned to an increasingly populist fiscal strategy: tax cuts for young people, higher pensions, large subsidies for home renovations, and consumer support schemes.
This stabilised the economy from the outside, but hollowed it out from within. Since 2020, Hungary’s budget deficit has ranged between 6% and 10% annually, and inflation has been the highest in the EU for several consecutive years. Industrial production has declined, and Chinese and South Korean investments (CATL, BYD, Samsung, SK On) have been scaled down or postponed.
Orbán’s narrative of national sovereignty has therefore collided with economic reality: without EU money, the Hungarian system collapses.