Geopolitical scenarios

Geopolitical decoupling increases the risk posed by quantum technology

The current geopolitical decoupling increases the risk associated with quantum technology. Which countries and alliances possess both the breadth and depth of knowledge required to be the first to achieve full quantum capability? And how should boards of directors approach quantum technology as an irreversible and time-asymmetric condition?

This blog post is the final in a three-part series on quantum technologies:

  1. The development of quantum technology is rapidly accelerating
  2. Quantum technology introduces new risks, including for the financial sector
  3. Geopolitical decoupling increases the risk posed by quantum technology

Geopolitical fragmentation increases uncertainty

If current geopolitical trends are extrapolated, it is realistic to expect a multipolar landscape with three to four competing standards regimes. The West is likely to pursue two different post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards (EU vs. US), while China will develop its own parallel system. For the financial sector, this implies that interoperability becomes a geopolitical issue. This leaves open fundamental questions such as how international trades and payments will be settled in practice, and who ultimately bears conversion risk and counterparty risk. 

The great powers have different strengths and weaknesses today

Overall, the picture suggests that while quantum technology (together with AI) is the United States’ “must-win battle” (often referred to as its “Manhattan Project”), the EU has relatively strong preconditions to keep pace in this area — primarily because the EU generally enjoys the highest level of trust among third countries. The systemically relevant winner will be the actor that combines innovation and speed with trust, because quantum technology is fundamentally a power instrument, not merely a compliance challenge.

  • The EU: The ECB and national central banks have moved early and focus strongly on standards, interoperability, and infrastructure stability. Quantum technology is viewed primarily as a systemic trust challenge. EU weaknesses include a fragmented industrial ecosystem that depends on non-EU suppliers and relatively long decision-making cycles. The EU typically prefers to be “late with something robust rather than early with something fragile.” At the same time, this inclusive and standards-driven approach fosters trust among third countries.
  • The US: The US is currently the global leader in quantum computing and has historically been fast at deploying new technologies through Big Tech. In addition, NIST (MIST) sets global standards for PQC. The US weakness, however, lies in limited systemic coordination. In 2025, for example, the Federal Reserve was instructed to halt its CBDC project as part of a shift toward a “free banking system.” Going forward, infrastructure and money creation are expected to rely more heavily on private DLT-based solutions, with an initial focus on stablecoins developed by Big Tech in cooperation with banks. This paradigm shift has raised concerns among third countries about insufficient systemic coordination. Private Big Tech innovation philosophies often prioritise “innovation first, system coherence later.”
  • China: China has made massive state investments in quantum technology and treats it as a strategic priority. Its strengths include tight systemic integration between the military, financial system, and telecommunications sector, as well as very early deployment of quantum key distribution (QKD). Its weaknesses include limited transparency, low international interoperability, and a broader international trust deficit. This has also been evident in the BRICS+ context, where attempts to build an alternative system over several years have met limited support from member states.

For boards, it is now critical to understand the implications

Like AI, quantum technology is dangerous not because of its intrinsic power, but because leadership, timing, and coordination often lag behind. 

Quantum computers represent a temporal risk more than a purely technological risk. They change when information becomes vulnerable and who gains access to the past. For European owners, this raises the question of when historical data — accumulated knowledge and experience — becomes a strategic asset for others. As such, quantum technology has a far broader impact on strategic autonomy than most other forms of IT hardware development. 

That said, the probability of severe disruption can be significantly reduced, as regulators have anticipated large parts of the transition. However, their plans risk becoming outdated, as the pace of development is currently accelerating. 

It is the responsibility of executive management to monitor and assess breakthroughs in quantum technology and their operational impact. It is the responsibility of the board to ensure that the company does not become trapped in an irreversible transition phase.

Boards should consider, among others, the following questions

Boards should consider, among others, the following questions:

  1. Is our current cybersecurity strategy time-robust, or merely robust for today?
  2. Which data, contracts, and intellectual property could threaten our business if they become readable in five years’ time? (Not all data needs PQC protection today — only data that retains value in 5–10 years.)
  3. Which quantum capabilities will we depend on, and under which jurisdictions?
  4. Have we committed to a single PQC standard? What is our response if that standard is later abandoned?
  5. The hybrid period: when does it become too late to migrate to PQC solutions?
  6. How far can quantum technology advance before our current strategy breaks down?
  7. How do we ensure that quantum- and AI-based decision-support systems remain understandable and auditable?
  8. What is the impact if competitors gain quantum access before us, and we discover it too late?
  9. Are our current risk models robust to technological asymmetry?
  10. Which suppliers, standards, or partnerships are geopolitically vulnerable?
  11. Does management have sufficient practical understanding, overview, and networks?
  12. Which experts are we building our quantum understanding and preparedness with?

In summary, quantum technology constitutes a technological arms race. It is dangerous because it changes who knows what, and when, not because the acceleration of the technology itself is inherently harmful.

Quantum technology gives the winners opportunities for step-changes in R&D and overall knowledge levels. The losers will be those institutions that migrate too late, without coordination, or merely symbolically.

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