Since the U.S. presidential election in November 2024, the independence of the Federal Reserve has come under pressure. In 2026, the same may apply to several of the EU’s central banks. Italy is among the most prominent cases, as its draft Finance Bill for 2026 contains new types of wording that hint at political involvement.
Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves mentioned in the Finance Bill
Italy’s draft Finance Bill for 2026 includes a seemingly innocuous sentence: “The gold reserves managed and held by Banca d’Italia belong to the State in the name of the Italian people.” This is the first time that gold reserves are mentioned explicitly in a Finance Bill. As a result, the question arises whether the state, directly or indirectly, is attempting to bring the gold into play – in other words, whether it is challenging Banca d’Italia’s independence.
Giorgia Meloni and the rest of the government reject any suggestion of hidden intentions. Nevertheless, the wording has triggered both international attention and market unease. This is hardly surprising. Banca d’Italia holds the world’s third-largest gold reserve (after the United States and Germany): approximately 2,450 tonnes of gold, with a market value of around USD 300 billion.
The gold reserve is a result of Italy’s financial prudence …
Italy’s large gold holdings are the result of historical necessity rooted in a post-war period marked by unusually strong financial discipline.
During World War II, the Nazis confiscated roughly 120 tonnes of gold, reinforcing the central bank’s belief in the importance of prudence and reserves. During the post-war economic miracle driven by industrialisation, large export surpluses denominated in dollars were therefore systematically converted into gold. This helped stabilise the weak lira and built a buffer against future crises. By 1960, the reserve had already grown to 1,400 tonnes. Since then, the gold has remained untouched and today accounts for almost 75% of Italy’s total reserves.
… and, unusually for Italy, remained protected when financial stability was at risk
Italy has consistently refused to sell gold during crises, unlike other European countries such as the UK, France, and Spain.
The explanation is institutional rather than political. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, Banca d’Italia has been fully legally independent and an integral part of the ECB system. The central bank has therefore maintained that gold holdings constitute a monetary reserve asset, not a budgetary instrument. Politicians have repeatedly attempted to challenge that position.
The gold reserve is too small to solve Italy’s debt problem …
Italy’s public debt now exceeds EUR 3 trillion, corresponding to more than 135% of GDP. Italy therefore faces a genuine risk of triggering a new EU debt crisis, reminiscent of Greece in 2011–12. Something must change if Italy is to move back toward the 60% debt-to-GDP ceiling set out in the Eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact.
Even a full sale of the gold reserve would cover less than 10% of the debt. The effect would therefore be temporary and primarily symbolic.
For this reason, Banca d’Italia has for years reiterated three core arguments against any sale:
- Gold is a strategic national asset and a crisis buffer
- It does not solve the debt problem
- EU law prohibits the use of central bank assets for state financing
… yet it still has political impact
According to most legal experts, the wording in the Finance Bill is in itself purely symbolic. Ownership and control of the gold are already defined through EU treaties, Italian legislation, and the ECB’s regulatory framework. Banca d’Italia is bound by the Eurosystem, and the gold can therefore only be sold with ECB approval. That is unlikely to happen.
Politically, however, the wording matters. The government has presented it as a symbolic and patriotic safeguard against “foreign shareholders” in the central bank. By contrast, the opposition fears that the value of the gold could gradually be brought into play by Meloni as an argument for tax cuts, subsidies, or postponing necessary and unpopular fiscal consolidation measures, somewhat reminiscent of Trump’s proposal to issue gold certificates as a basis for leveraging the U.S. sovereign wealth fund.
For the same reason, the ECB has already warned against the wording on two occasions.
Central bank independence is under growing pressure globally
This political uncertainty has emerged alongside a global comeback for gold. De-dollarisation, geopolitical fragmentation, and rising uncertainty have pushed the gold price above USD 4,000 per ounce. This makes Italy’s holdings more politically “visible” and revives broader debates about national control, repatriation of gold from the United States, and monetary sovereignty.
For now, Italian politicians cannot monetise the gold held by Banca d’Italia. But the episode signals growing tensions between national populism, central bank independence, and the institutional architecture of the Eurozone. For that reason, the debate is potentially damaging.
Italy’s discussion is unfolding at a time when many other central banks are experiencing political pressure. This is particularly evident in the United States, where the political ambition behind Project 2025 is a “free banking system”. It however also applies to:
- Turkey, where Erdoğan has repeatedly dismissed central bank governors
- Argentina, where Javier Milei seeks to abolish the central bank altogether
- Hungary, where Viktor Orbán has altered frameworks and incentives for the Nemzeti Bank
- Japan, where Sanae Takaichi is expected to attempt some form of Abenomics 2.0
- India, where Narendra Modi has had repeated conflicts with the central bank
The world has had poor experiences with this
The pattern is often the same. When public debt is high, an election approaches, growth is weak, populist narratives gain traction, and external shocks legitimise “temporary exceptions”, the desire to curtail central banks’ ability to conduct monetary policy re-emerges. Central bank independence is therefore not merely a technical issue. It is a core element of democratic and financial resilience.
The underlying question remains unresolved: Should global governance be rule-based, or transactional and political?