{"id":3365,"date":"2026-02-22T10:01:00","date_gmt":"2026-02-22T09:01:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/?p=3365"},"modified":"2026-01-29T09:48:11","modified_gmt":"2026-01-29T08:48:11","slug":"how-has-the-war-calculus-evolved","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/","title":{"rendered":"2 - How the war calculus has evolved"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Russia\u2019s war calculus has evolved significantly since the start of the war. What initially produced an economic boom has gradually turned into a sustained erosion of Russia\u2019s prosperity and future opportunities. How did the favourable effects dissipate, and what strategic options does this now leave Russia with?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the second article in a series of four on the effects of the war in Ukraine on Russia:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>What Is a War Economy<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>How the war calculus has evolved<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The current state of the economy<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The long-term outlook<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Russia\u2019s \u201cWar Calculus\u201d Has Changed Markedly Since the Outset of the War<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has now lasted four years. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/russias-grinding-war-ukraine\">For Russia, it has resulted in approximately 1.2 million soldiers killed or seriously wounded<\/a>. Russia currently occupies roughly 85,000 square kilometres (excluding Crimea), equivalent to around one seventh of Ukraine\u2019s territory or less than half a per cent of Russia\u2019s own landmass.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although Russia continues to seize additional territory following the consolidation of the front in the summer of 2022, progress has been measured in individual fields and villages. These military advances are exceptionally slow for a war in which roughly half a million soldiers have been deployed over four years. At the peak of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in April 1969, a total of 550,000 troops were deployed, including in neighbouring regions. At that point, the war had become economically devastating for the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The war in Ukraine has thus become a war of attrition. This increases the fragility of any future transition back to a civilian economy and, in turn, raises the risk of severe internal political instability at a later stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Russia Was Well Prepared; the West Was Not<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s transition to a war economy supported its economy for a surprisingly long period:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>First and foremost, Russia had <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2025\/09\/fortress-russia-economy-has-adapted-well-pressure-stagflation-presents-opportunity-west?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">prepared economically and financially over several decades<\/a>. Financial autonomy had been increased by reducing external debt (the Soviet Union formally dissolved on 25 December 1991 as a result of its default on debt), public debt had fallen below 20 per cent of GDP, the Central Bank of Russia had accumulated more than USD 600 billion in foreign exchange reserves, and approximately 10 per cent of GDP had been placed in the National Wealth Fund.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The war economy was further supported by the West\u2019s general slowness in responding beyond freezing roughly half of Russia\u2019s foreign exchange reserves (USD 300 billion, the majority held at Euroclear in Brussels).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Western trade sanctions were never implemented effectively, a gap Russia was quick to exploit. Russian missile defence systems and weapons such as the hypersonic Kinzhal missile still rely on semiconductors manufactured in the United States and Canada. Western caution was partly driven by concerns over relations with India, which benefited economically from discounted Russian oil and gained a new export market. As a result, secondary sanctions, financial penalties imposed on those assisting Russia, remain weak and ineffective.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Finally, the EU had continued its gradual military disarmament since 2014, to the point where most member states could no longer credibly defend themselves independently.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why the War Initially Proved an Economic Gain for Russia<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The war caught the West off guard. It took considerable time to understand Russia\u2019s intentions and how Ukraine could be supported effectively. At the same time, extremely high oil and gas prices in 2022 and 2023 provided a substantial boost to Russia\u2019s economy. EU purchases of Russian energy continued largely unchanged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since late 2023, however, this dynamic has reversed, and Russia\u2019s economic windfall has dissipated. This coincides with the rising cost and risk associated with a stagnating war, as illustrated in the model above. The value of the \u201cspoils of war\u201d has declined, while Russia\u2019s civilian real assets have steadily deteriorated. Social consequences have intensified the longer the war has continued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The \u201cSpoils of War\u201d Calculus Has Shifted: Natural Resources, \u2026<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On paper, the spoils of war appeared promising in the form of mineral resources, oil, and wheat, assets of potentially significant geopolitical leverage. In reality, however, enormous investment would be required to generate even modest returns within a decade. The largest cost to Russia is more diffuse: exclusion from international commodity and debt markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>In the Donbas region, oil and coal extraction are the only activities that remain economically viable. Russia already possesses abundant oil reserves.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ukraine\u2019s most strategically valuable minerals, such as rare earth elements and graphite, are located primarily near Kharkiv and in central Ukraine. Conditional on peace, extraction agreements have been signed with U.S. mining companies (in which the Trump family itself holds investments). The United States is generally determined to secure its supply chains, an argument even cited in discussions about a potential military takeover of Greenland. From this perspective, the U.S. has a strong interest in defending Ukraine, with the exception of Donbas.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"960\" height=\"962\" src=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Ukraine-minerals-underground.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3367\" style=\"aspect-ratio:0.9979339648384205;width:427px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Ukraine-minerals-underground.png 960w, https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Ukraine-minerals-underground-300x300.png 300w, https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Ukraine-minerals-underground-150x150.png 150w, https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Ukraine-minerals-underground-768x770.png 768w, https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Ukraine-minerals-underground-12x12.png 12w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">--- Agriculture, ...<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">t will take many years before Russia can cultivate seized wheat fields, repopulate cities, operate steel plants, or extract minerals in the Donbas region. These areas remain within range of Ukrainian artillery, but, more critically, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/demining-ukraine-outcomes-2025-ukraine-mine-action-conference\">vast territories are heavily mined<\/a>. CSIS estimates that complete demining of the region could take several decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Russia\u2019s annexation of the strategically important Crimean Peninsula in 2014 was possible largely because Ukraine had not prepared for a military invasion and because the West refrained from providing financial support or isolating Russia economically. Western hesitation was partly justified by the fact that Crimea had only been (re)transferred to Ukraine in 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev reassigned it.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u2026 Access to Export Markets \u2026<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Access to the international community is critical for Russia\u2019s civilian economy, which remains heavily dependent on exports of raw materials and energy. Western sanctions have been only partially effective, forcing Russia to accept settlement of oil exports to India and China in rupees and renminbi, at an effective discount of approximately 23 per cent relative to Brent crude (the \u201cUrals\u201d price).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>At the start of the war, Russia rapidly redirected oil exports to India and China. Both countries, however, have long histories with Russia marked by deep mistrust and painful conflicts. As a result, they import Russian energy only while discounts remain substantial and while it serves their geopolitical interest to keep Western attention focused on Russia. This helps explain why BRICS+ cooperation has made <a href=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/brics-versus-usd-2\/\">limited progress over the past four years beyond expanding membership<\/a>. Russia has long sought deeper integration, yet even basic issues such as international settlements have seen little advancement, an outcome that directly undermines Russia\u2019s strategic autonomy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u2026 and Access to International Credit Markets<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Neither the EU nor the United States has been fully effective in excluding Russia from international financial and energy markets. In 2024, EU member states provided EUR 19 billion in aid to Ukraine while paying EUR 22 billion to Russia for energy via the TurkStream and Druzhba pipelines. Under the REPowerEU plan, the EU aims to cease all imports of Russian energy by 2027.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Russia has been able to redirect oil exports, but it can redirect only around one fifth of its natural gas exports.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Russian Duma Has Adopted Confiscation Legislation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since 2023, President Putin has issued decrees permitting the confiscation of assets owned by \u201cunfriendly\u201d countries. In January of this year, the Duma elevated these measures into permanent legislation. <a href=\"https:\/\/atlasinstitute.org\/russias-war-economy-a-growing-global-political-risk\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">The Atlas Institute expects this to slow Chinese and Indian foreign direct investment<\/a>. Yet Russia is increasingly dependent on Chinese and Indian technology and consumer goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>African countries have generally supported Russia, despite Russia often being their primary competitor in mineral and energy extraction. This reflects Russia\u2019s image as a smaller challenger willing to defy both the United States and China. Unlike the EU, Russia does not attempt to influence African governance standards or environmental and human rights practices. Moreover, Russia\u2019s relatively modest economic size, its GDP is smaller than Italy\u2019s, can be more easily overlooked.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fundamentally, however, <a href=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/us-trade-wars-agricultural-products-2\/\">Russia remains a major exporter of essential wheat and fertilisers<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"480\" height=\"480\" src=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Russia-dominant-exporter-of-wheat.jpeg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3368\" srcset=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Russia-dominant-exporter-of-wheat.jpeg 480w, https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Russia-dominant-exporter-of-wheat-300x300.jpeg 300w, https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Russia-dominant-exporter-of-wheat-150x150.jpeg 150w, https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Russia-dominant-exporter-of-wheat-12x12.jpeg 12w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 480px) 100vw, 480px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">A Response to Growing Industrial Degradation \u2026<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There is a fundamental distinction between military and civilian industrial assets:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>According to ISW, Russia\u2019s military-industrial complex has now been reconfigured to fully replace mat\u00e9riel losses at the front. During the transition period, Russia drew heavily on vast and ageing military stockpiles. T-54 tanks from the 1940s and 1950s are still being deployed, though in declining numbers\u2014an indication that legacy reserves are being exhausted and that newer equipment will increasingly be committed. Russia\u2019s drone technology is now on par with that of Ukraine and the West and has achieved sufficient scale to build inventories.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Civilian industry, however, has been systematically converted to military production. <a href=\"https:\/\/atlasinstitute.org\/russias-war-economy-a-growing-global-political-risk\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">Armoured vehicles are now produced in factories that once manufactured cars<\/a>.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>There are signs that the limits of industrial conversion are being reached, most notably acute labour shortages. Russia has therefore begun inviting guest workers from Africa.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u2026 Converted and Undermaintained<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Before the war, Russia\u2019s industrial exports focused primarily on energy, basic industrial goods, and, to some extent, military equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The military sector has strengthened as a result of the war, becoming more technologically current and expanding capacity. However, it has also become critically dependent on Chinese exports, particularly semiconductors that Russia cannot produce domestically. Russia has set an ambitious goal of becoming a global leader in semiconductors and artificial intelligence. Achieving this goal depends on parallel imports from friendly countries. In practice, Russia has very few true allies <a href=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/russias-and-chinas-friendship-without-limits\/\">, and for historical reasons this does not include China<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The energy sector, by contrast, has deteriorated significantly. Investment in natural gas has declined as export volumes and prospects diminish. This includes Nord Stream 1 and 2, in which Gazprom held majority stakes prior to the September 2022 sabotage. It also includes Power of Siberia 2, where price negotiations with China revolve around levels only marginally above Russia\u2019s extraction costs. Russia must also bear almost the entire capital investment for the 2,600-kilometre pipeline. The result is an agreement that is economically disadvantageous for Russia but provides short-term cash flow from China. Russia\u2019s LNG exports are also constrained by insufficient liquefaction capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u2026 Particularly in Broader Infrastructure<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s territory has largely escaped direct war damage. However, there are no comprehensive, data-driven assessments by international organisations regarding the extent of degradation in Russia\u2019s infrastructure, roads, utilities, and real estate stock.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Estimates from ISW and the UK Ministry of Defence nevertheless suggest extensive underinvestment. Construction sector statistics and the degree of civilian industrial conversion indicate that maintenance spending over the past four years has been roughly half of pre-war levels. Russia is thus accumulating an increasingly large backlog of deferred maintenance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s supply lines are also at risk. Baltic states have begun intercepting vessels suspected of sabotaging fibre-optic cables. Ukraine has started attacking tankers returning for refuelling. The United States has suggested it may tolerate pirate attacks on vessels trading with Russia. Such developments could disrupt imports of consumer goods and exports of wheat, nickel, and copper. Russia\u2019s navy is far too small to provide credible protection for civilian shipping.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Largest Bill Has Yet to Become Visible \u2026<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The social consequences may represent the greatest long-term risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em>Demobilised soldiers:<\/em> In Afghanistan, Soviet casualties including severe injuries totalled around 10,000. In Ukraine, the figure now approaches 1.2 million, including up to 50,000 from North Korea and China. For this reason alone, Putin must demonstrate some form of victory in Ukraine; failure would be humiliating for both North Korea and China.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>Deserters and refugees <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cgra.be\/sites\/default\/files\/rapporten\/euaa_coi_report_russian_federation_country_focus_20251202.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">are estimated at between 50,000 and 100,000,<\/a>equivalent to 10\u201320 per cent of deployed Russian forces<em>.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u2026 and Could Potentially Fracture Society<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Asymmetric casualties<\/em>: According to Western intelligence assessments, fatalities in the war are disproportionately drawn from Russia\u2019s eastern (Siberian) and southern regions, including Tuva, the home region of Putin\u2019s former close ally Sergei Shoigu. These regions already exhibited the strongest secessionist tendencies. By contrast, casualty rates around Moscow and St Petersburg remain very low.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Will this intensify secessionist pressure in peripheral regions following a ceasefire or peace agreement? Alternatively, does it render these regions militarily vulnerable, for example, <a href=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/russias-and-chinas-friendship-without-limits\/\">unable to defend themselves against a potential Chinese \u201creunification\u201d with Outer Manchuria<\/a> (including Khabarovsk and Vladivostok), <a href=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/chinas-and-russias-friendship-without-limits\/\">a theme China has repeatedly revisited in recent years<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image aligncenter size-large is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"776\" src=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/death-rate-ukraine-russia-1024x776.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3369\" style=\"width:441px;height:auto\" srcset=\"\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" data-srcset=\"\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">This Produces a Political Risk and Thus Centralisation of Power<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These risks have prompted Putin to <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/russia-eurasia\/politika\/2025\/03\/russia-putin-elites-control?lang=en&amp;utm_source=ctw&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=btnlink\">further centralise political power within his own family<\/a>. Russia\u2019s internal oversight functions are now dominated by the Putin family. This includes figures such as Kirill Dmitriev, Russia\u2019s peace negotiator, who has close ties to Jared Kushner and to Putin\u2019s daughter, Yekaterina Tikhonova, and now plays a central role alongside Sergei Lavrov and Yuri Ushakov. It also includes Sergei Tsivilev, who oversees figures such as Igor Sechin (Rosneft), Alexei Miller (Gazprom), and Gennady Timchenko.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The greater the degree of control and centralisation, however, the weaker the feedback loop and the poorer the quality of Putin\u2019s decision-making. Over time, this creates a deep and systemic risk of strategic misjudgement, reminiscent of the late Soviet period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For the West, this increases the likelihood that any peace agreement over Ukraine would merely constitute a pause, used by both sides to rearm. For Russia, this is a political necessity to avoid internal fracture. For the West, it is a requirement for credible self-defence.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ruslands krigs-kalkule har udviklet sig siden krigens start. D\u00e9t, der i starten f\u00f8rte til et \u00f8konomisk boom, har udviklet sig til en \u00f8konomisk nedslidning af Ruslands velstand og fremtids muligheder. Hvordan forsvandt de gunstige p\u00e5virkninger, og hvilke muligheder giver det Rusland? Dette er andet indl\u00e6g i r\u00e6kken p\u00e5 4 om effekten p\u00e5 Rusland af krigen [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":3383,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[28,29,35],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3365","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-geooekonomi","category-geopolitik","category-topledelse"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>2 - Hvordan har krigs-kalkulen udviklet sig - Kraft Scharling<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Ruslands krigs-kalkule har udviklet sig siden krigens start. Hvordan det \u00f8konomiske boom i starten har udviklet sig til en nedslidning\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/how-has-the-war-calculus-evolved\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"2 - Hvordan har krigs-kalkulen udviklet sig - Kraft Scharling\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Ruslands krigs-kalkule har udviklet sig siden krigens start. Hvordan det \u00f8konomiske boom i starten har udviklet sig til en nedslidning\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/how-has-the-war-calculus-evolved\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Kraft Scharling\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-02-22T09:01:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1200\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"800\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Henrik Kraft Scharling\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Henrik Kraft Scharling\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Estimated reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"13 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Henrik Kraft Scharling\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/9d2c1bfdbe9593d413234cdde1c1731a\"},\"headline\":\"2 &#8211; Hvordan har krigs-kalkulen udviklet sig\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-02-22T09:01:00+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":2397,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg\",\"articleSection\":[\"Geo\u00f8konomi\",\"Geopolitik\",\"Topledelse\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/\",\"name\":\"2 - Hvordan har krigs-kalkulen udviklet sig - Kraft Scharling\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-02-22T09:01:00+00:00\",\"description\":\"Ruslands krigs-kalkule har udviklet sig siden krigens start. Hvordan det \u00f8konomiske boom i starten har udviklet sig til en nedslidning\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg\",\"width\":1200,\"height\":800,\"caption\":\"War economy\"},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kraft Scharling\",\"description\":\"\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Kraft Scharling\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/KraftScharling_logo_org-e1739344438206.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/KraftScharling_logo_org-e1739344438206.png\",\"width\":360,\"height\":360,\"caption\":\"Kraft Scharling\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kraftscharling.dk\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/9d2c1bfdbe9593d413234cdde1c1731a\",\"name\":\"Henrik Kraft Scharling\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"2 - How the war calculus has evolved - Kraft Scharling","description":"Russia\u2019s war calculus has changed since the start of the war. What initially produced an economic boom is now eroding Russia's prosperity","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/how-has-the-war-calculus-evolved\/","og_locale":"en_GB","og_type":"article","og_title":"2 - Hvordan har krigs-kalkulen udviklet sig - Kraft Scharling","og_description":"Ruslands krigs-kalkule har udviklet sig siden krigens start. Hvordan det \u00f8konomiske boom i starten har udviklet sig til en nedslidning","og_url":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/how-has-the-war-calculus-evolved\/","og_site_name":"Kraft Scharling","article_published_time":"2026-02-22T09:01:00+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1200,"height":800,"url":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Henrik Kraft Scharling","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Henrik Kraft Scharling","Estimated reading time":"13 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/"},"author":{"name":"Henrik Kraft Scharling","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#\/schema\/person\/9d2c1bfdbe9593d413234cdde1c1731a"},"headline":"2 &#8211; Hvordan har krigs-kalkulen udviklet sig","datePublished":"2026-02-22T09:01:00+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/"},"wordCount":2397,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg","articleSection":["Geo\u00f8konomi","Geopolitik","Topledelse"],"inLanguage":"en-GB"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/","url":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/","name":"2 - How the war calculus has evolved - Kraft Scharling","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg","datePublished":"2026-02-22T09:01:00+00:00","description":"Russia\u2019s war calculus has changed since the start of the war. What initially produced an economic boom is now eroding Russia's prosperity","inLanguage":"en-GB","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-GB","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/hvordan-har-krigs-kalkulen-udviklet-sig\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2-Front-picture-Russia-economy.jpg","width":1200,"height":800,"caption":"War economy"},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#website","url":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/","name":"Kraft Scharling","description":"","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-GB"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#organization","name":"Kraft Scharling","url":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-GB","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/KraftScharling_logo_org-e1739344438206.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/KraftScharling_logo_org-e1739344438206.png","width":360,"height":360,"caption":"Kraft Scharling"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/#\/schema\/person\/9d2c1bfdbe9593d413234cdde1c1731a","name":"Henrik Kraft Scharling"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3365","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3365"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3365\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3384,"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3365\/revisions\/3384"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3383"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3365"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3365"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kraftscharling.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3365"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}