A US after NATO was unthinkable 3 months ago. Ceteris paribus it will erode the US superpower status
Trump has eroded NATOs "musketeer-oath" ...
During his first presidency, Trump was very clear in his foreign and security policy stance that he wanted the U.S. to withdraw from NATO. During the 2024 campaign, he repeatedly questioned the U.S.'s commitment to NATO’s core Article 5—the Musketeer Oath—stating that he would “… encourage Russia to do whatever the hell they want” over for et hvilket som helst NATO medlemsland, “… that doesn’t pay enough”. He later adjusted this stance, arguing that the current 2% spending threshold was insufficient, saying, “…and perhaps not even 5% of GDP” would be enough. Whether a country met the requirement, he added, would depend on whether its weapons systems were of sufficiently high quality—by which he likely meant American-made.
Trump’s push against NATO has paradoxically strengthened domestic unity in the U.S., despite challenging its most loyal allies.
- In 2024, a Gallup poll showed that 67% of Americans wanted to remain in NATO or even increase U.S. support, while 16% favored reducing its role, and only 12% supported a complete withdrawal.
- However, by early March, following the unusual Oval Office press conference with Zelensky, support for NATO had dropped to around 50%, with a clear majority of MAGA supporters favoring withdrawal.
… and thus its value has effectively ceased to exist ...
But even if Trump wants to leave NATO entirely, the decision legally rests with Congress. A full withdrawal would require a two-thirds majority in the Senate, where Republicans hold “only” 53 out of 100 seats.
However, the U.S. could effectively leave NATO by assuming only a logistical role, closing most of its bases in Europe, and recalling troops. So far, however, the U.S. has not reached that point. In fact, it is currently seeking to increase its military presence in countries such as Denmark.
... although the US' geopolitical interest herein is very questionablen ...
It is also crucial to note that it is Trump, not the U.S. military, that wants to leave NATO.
- In December 1998, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair agreed on the St. Malo Declaration, which aimed to establish a European pillar within NATO.
- The initiative was largely shot down by the U.S., with then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright arguing that it conflicted with U.S. geopolitical interests.
- Former U.S. NATO Commander (2009–2013) James Stavridis warned in early March that a U.S. withdrawal from NATO would be “a mistake of epic proportions”It was Stravridis' assessment that Europe as a result would be far less likely to support the U.S. in global foreign and security policy.
At its core, the U.S. risks its superpower status by breaking deeply with NATO. However, some of its credibility remains if Europeans develop their own military capacity to stand on their own.
- Maintaining the world’s leading military is essential for securing supply lines and upholding the U.S. dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency, cf above.
- However, remaining the world’s leading military force requires technological superiority, which in turn demands enormous investments in research and development. That, in turn, requires economies of scale—best financed through arms exports. If the EU falls under Russian influence or builds sufficient strategic autonomy in its defense industry, the U.S.’s ability to fund its technological edge diminishes, thereby challenging its military dominance.
... including in other alliances
Additionally, the U.S. would lose general trust among allies such as Quad partners India, Australia, and Japan if it definitively breaks its NATO commitments. Why should these nations trust the U.S. to keep its word to them?
- Similarly, why should the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, continue sharing their most critical intelligence with the U.S. if they cannot trust its commitments?
- The U.S.'s military strength, both in combat power and, more importantly, intelligence, diminishes when trust among its allies erodes over time.
Ultimately, superpower status is a function of how much trust third-party nations place in the U.S. Among European nations, trust in the U.S. is currently very low. In Germany, for example, an ARD poll found that only 16% of Germans believe Europe can rely on the U.S. This lack of confidence is reflected in Friedrich Merz's current rhetoric.
Politically it has led to lack of trust between the U.S. and EU ...
The distrust also extends to political circles. When von der Leyen, Costa, and Kallas recently debriefed NATO countries that are not EU members, only one country was not invited: the U.S.
This deep concern stems from widespread dependence on the U.S. In Canada, for example, there is an open parliamentary debate about canceling its order for 88 U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets. The U.S. supplies the spare parts, and only the U.S. can update the jets’ software.
The same concern exists worldwide—and it could turn against U.S. interests. Why should African or Asian countries trust the U.S. when their trade volumes with the U.S. are far smaller than with the EU?
... and without alliance partners it is difficult to remain a superpower
The U.S. loses superpower status when it becomes too transactional or changes course too frequently.
- Trust in international politics is built on consistency—the ability to count on agreements and predict future actions. This is precisely where the U.S. will face growing difficulties. Trump struggles to maintain focus.
- A 2021 meeting in Alaska between U.S. and Chinese diplomats led to a rare public confrontation, where Antony Blinken accused China of “threatening the rules-based order.”
- Four years later, China is now accusing the U.S. of the same—fueling deeper skepticism toward the U.S. in many developing nations.
- Distrust has also increased due to cuts to USAID’s budget. Closing off aid to developing nations is equivalent to shutting down U.S. influence in the very countries that supply it with critical raw materials and minerals.
- Russia and China (via the Belt and Road Initiative) have eagerly capitalized on these cutbacks, gaining unprecedented momentum in Africa and South America.
- Thus, Trump risks inadvertently strengthening BRICS cooperation.
U.S. superpower status is also under pressure in Asia. At the China Conference in February, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar bin Ibrahim—ASEAN’s acting chair—declared, “Asean’s moment is now”, in response to U.S. AI policies and the prospect of a tariff war.. Ibrahim particularly addressed “economic coercion and unilateral actions”—arguing that ASEAN should focus on AI and the digital economy while securing strategic autonomy in energy and data (AI).
Thus, China and Russia gain most from the U.S.' de-coupling
As a result, China—and to a lesser extent, Russia—are the short-term winners of Trump’s dismantling of U.S. global relations. Trump is currently sending conciliatory signals to Russia but likely has no interest in closer cooperation with China.
- The America First Investment Policy (AFIP) is the core of Trump’s trade wars, based on the principle that “economic security is national security”. AFIP primarily aims to distance the U.S. from everything Chinese.
- This aligns with the theory that the U.S. is currently pursuing a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy—attempting to shift Russia’s allegiance away from China and toward the U.S. to isolate Beijing. This theory was confirmed by JD Vance and Pete Hegseth in late February.
- The theory refers to Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic détente with China in the early 1970s, which successfully isolated the Soviet Union.
However, the China-Russia relationship today is far less strained than it was in the 1970s. That said, China still has significant geopolitical interests in reclaiming Outer Manchuria—the territory now known as Eastern Siberia, including Khabarovsk and VladivostokYet, the Reverse Kissinger theory has an inherent flaw: Russia knows all too well how frequently U.S. global policies can change every four years. Geopolitically, Russia is opportunistic—but it is also fundamentally pragmatic.
All in all, Trumps change agenda is urgent
In summary, Trump's change agenda is urgent. The economy has vulnerabilities that are exacerbated by his economic policies, and the U.S. depends both on increased foreign investment and rising tariff revenues. Therefore, Trump needs to demonstrate to U.S. allies and the world that it is America that calls the shots. It is unlikely that the U.S.’s well-considered goal is to withdraw from NATO—rather, it is a means to free up resources that can be focused elsewhere, most likely against China.
However, in a massive restructuring of a country (or a corporation) like the one Trump has embarked on, one fundamental premise remains: consistency. Cultures and structures are built on trust between individuals. Trust is built over time, and it crumbles if communication and initiatives are not followed through or sustained until they take effect.
Herein lies perhaps the greatest risk posed by Trump and Vance: while the economy may survive four chaotic years, global trust in the U.S. is at stake. Unlike during Trump's first presidency, this time there are alternatives to the U.S., such as China and BRICS+, which can assume parts of America's superpower status. They can do so particularly because the U.S. has decoupled from its traditional allies—the EU, Canada, and Mexico. Power is a function of how others perceive you. If America's alliances crumble, the U.S. appears weaker. That perception alone can empower its alternatives.